Abstract-Side-channel information leaks have been reported in various online applications, especially, in wireless local area networks (WLANs) due to the shared-medium nature of wireless links and the ease of eavesdropping. Even when Wi-Fi traffic is encrypted, its characteristics are identifiable, which can be used to infer sensitive user activities and data. Existing countermeasures do not offer effective and efficient protection: packet padding and traffic morphing often bring in substantial communication overheads; attempts to anonymize user identifiers are vulnerable to the analysis based upon traffic statistics.
I. INTRODUCTION
S IDE-CHANNEL information leaks are pervasive in different communication scenarios, including web browsing [1] , [2] , video-streaming [3] , voice over-IP (VoIP) applications [4] [5], and secure shell (SSH) [6] . These information leaks are mostly caused by analyzing statistical characteristics of encrypted traffic, such as distributions of packet sizes, interpacket timings and others. Adversaries are found to be able to tailor traffic analysis techniques to seriously threaten user privacy, even when the traffic is protected by up-to-date encryption techniques. Just through the analysis on traffic characteristics, for example, adversaries can identify online activities (e.g., web-browsing, chatting, online gaming, online Manuscript received September 26, 2012 ; revised February 23 and August 25, 2013; accepted August 29, 2013 . The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was R. Mallik.
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W. video, and downloading) [7] - [9] , then infer the sources of web pages or contents of those online activities [1] , [10] , and further obtain sensitive information, such as health records, family incomes, and investment strategies etc [2] .
The threat of traffic analysis is particularly serious in wireless networks, which has been widely deployed in residential, hotspot, and campus environments for Internet access. Due to the shared-medium nature of wireless links, adversaries can easily eavesdrop on a specific user's traffic using sniffer software (e.g., Wireshark, Aircrack-ng). For example, it was reported that the Google street view team "inadvertently" collected Wi-Fi traffic snippets that people sent over wireless links [11] . In another example, prior research shows that through sniffing Wi-Fi traffic, a stranger on the street can glean enterprise employees' search queries, despite the protection of Wi-Fi encryptions (WPA/WPA2) [2] .
To defend against traffic analysis, techniques have been developed to make traffic characteristics less identifiable. Commonly used strategies alter the distribution of packet size through padding packets [1] , [2] , faking superfluous packets, and chopping packets into fixed size segments [12] . One can also use traffic morphing techniques [13] to make the statistical features of one class of traffic look like those of another class. These approaches, however, often introduce significant communication overheads [2] , and require remote servers (e.g., web servers and multimedia servers) to change the packet size distribution for each application or each user, which make their deployment questionable.
An alternative approach is to use anonymous communication [14] , [15] , the identifier-free approach [16] and pseudonym [17] , [18] to prevent adversaries from associating individual packets with a specific user. However, prior research shows traffic characteristics (e.g., packet distribution and received signal strength indicator (RSSI)) may still allow an eavesdropper to identify the party in communication [19] , thereby disclosing his/her sensitive information.
To achieve both effective and efficient defense against traffic analysis, we present in this paper a novel design, called traffic demultiplexing. Our idea is to partition a Wi-Fi traffic flow into snippets, each composed of a subset of the packets in the flow, when transmitting these packets through different virtual Media-Access-Control (MAC) interfaces to a Wi-Fi channel. These snippets are later reassembled at a Wi-Fi Access Point (AP), such as a wireless router, before the communication is relayed to the Internet. This presents to a Wi-Fi eavesdropper multiple traffic flows from different sources, each with traffic characteristics sufficiently deviated from the original flow and apparently independent of those from other MAC 1536-1276/14$31.00 c 2014 IEEE interfaces. These flows can be further adjusted to look like being produced by different Internet activities. As a result, the adversary can be cheated into believing that multiple users are running different programs on different systems. Given this confusion of application contexts, private user information becomes much more difficult to extract. Compared with prior approaches, our techniques avoid aggressive padding to achieve a similar level of protection, thereby performing more efficiently. To make this happen, we developed a new MAC layer traffic partition approach that includes MAC layer virtualization and dynamic packet scheduling over multiple virtual MAC interfaces, and conducted a thorough evaluation of the techniques. We provide a demo for our proposed technique http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wxw60 WK2t8.
We summarize the contributions of the paper below:
• Novel defense against Wi-Fi side-channel analysis. Compared with existing techniques, our novel design achieves a much more cost-effective defense against traffic analysis over wireless links. Specifically, traffic demultiplexing operates at the MAC layer, hence provides a more generic protection for the applications than the high-level mitigation designed specifically for these applications [2] , [13] . Further, our design partitions the traffic over wireless links into snippets and sends the snippets through multiple virtual MAC interfaces to hide their traffic characteristics, which avoids the significant overhead other approaches incur for packet padding and noise adding. Finally, the new technique grants Wi-Fi users a finegrained control on how their traffic is divided, and offers new scheduling strategies to assign traffic snippets to different interfaces. This makes a Wi-Fi eavesdropper more difficult at identifying the features of the original traffic.
•Implementation. We implemented a prototype of our techniques on the Multiband Atheros Driver for Wi-Fi (MadWifi). Through MAC layer virtualization, virtual wireless interfaces can be dynamically created and their attributes can be configured (e.g., MAC address, transmission power and data rate). Our approach treats each virtual interface as a regular network interface, and schedules network traffic onto these interfaces according to a set of user-defined packet scheduling algorithms, including ours that are designed to optimize traffic demultiplexing. The prototype we implemented includes a perpacket-based transmission power control (TPC) technique to prevent adversaries from inferring user identification through the strengths of Wi-Fi signals, and the countermeasures to thwart attempts to link virtual interfaces to a given user. Also, our technique is built to be transparent to upper layers and be compatible with the IEEE 802.11 standards.
•Evaluations. We evaluated traffic demultiplexing in real WLAN environments under different traffic analysis attacks. Experiments show that the technique effectively suppresses traffic analysis: it reduced the classification accuracy from 83.24% to 44.21% for online activities, from 30.6% to 5.0% for the web page identification attack, and from 78.3% to 60.0% for language identification in VoIP traffic, without noticeable overhead. Meanwhile, our study demonstrates that traffic demultiplexing does not incur noticeable network performance degradation and scales well when deployed in real WLANs.
The preliminary idea of scheduling traffic onto multiple interfaces has been discussed in our previous work [20] , where a scheduling algorithm was presented, and packets are scheduled only according to the packet size range. However, with the proposed scheduling algorithm in [20] an attacker may easily infer which virtual interfaces are used by a specific user through combination analysis. On the other hand, several implementation issues are also ignored in [20] , such as which communication layers should be changed to implement the demultiplexing idea, what protocols should be affected and adapted with traffic demultiplexing, how to prevent against timing analysis attack by an attacker to figure out which interfaces belong to which user, how network performance will be affected if users adopt multiple interfaces in reality, and how to make the proposed idea against a wide range of sidechannel information leak in Wi-Fi networks besides the online activity information leak, including web page identification, and the leak of VoIP features.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the background of our work in Section II. We then describe the detailed design and implementation of traffic demultiplexing in Section III. Section IV presents the security analysis. In Section V, we evaluate traffic demultiplexing through experimental testing in real WLANs. We summarize the related work in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Attack Model
Traffic analysis techniques have been studied for decades [1] - [10] . The adversary assumption is that the attacker can eavesdrop on communication traffic, and observe its characteristics, such as packet size, interarrival timing and Wi-Fi signal strength, etc. Using the traces of these characteristics, the adversary can classify them to infer sensitive user information through various machine learning techniques, such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Neural Network (NN), Bayesian techniques and Hidden Markov Models (HMM). Prior research shows that these techniques can succeed on a wide range of online applications [5] , [9] , [21] , [22] . In our research, we consider the following three common attack scenarios, which are extensively studied in prior work, to evaluate the efficacy of our new technique:
• Identification of user online activities. Traffic characteristics, such as packet interarrival time and packet size, can be used to profile users' actual online activities (e.g., web-browsing, chatting, online game, online video, and downloading), even when the traffic is encrypted [8] , [9] .
• Identification of web pages. Sun, et al. [1] and Liberatore, et al. [10] show that it is possible to accurately identify a web page by using only the sizes of the packets and the direction which they passed through (i.e., from or to the client) in the encrypted traffic.
• Identification of VoIP features. Wright, et al. [4] show that when VoIP packets are compressed with variable bit rate (VBR) encoding schemes and encrypted with a lengthpreserving stream cipher, it is possible to determine the language spoken in the encrypted conversation by running classifiers (e.g., HMM and Bayesian) on "bit rate." Note that different from those prior studies, which mainly focus on IP packets, we look at the threat on the MAC layer: our approach works on frame sizes without knowing their endto-end information.
B. Objectives
Existing countermeasures against Wi-Fi side-channel leaks either incur significant overheads and cause performance degradation or are found to be less effective. For example, physical space security and jamming [23] , [24] aim to reduce the number of packets that can be overheard by eavesdroppers but introduce interference with legitimate communication [19] . As another example, anonymity channels [14] , [15] and the identifier-free approach [16] were used to conceal user identifiers from a Wi-Fi eavesdropper. However, prior research shows that these approaches are vulnerable to physical layer fingerprinting [19] (e.g., RSSI values), which allows the adversary to associate Wi-Fi packets with a specific user. In addition, the overheads of encryption and key management of these techniques were found to be substantial, resulting in a throughput degradation of 10% according to a prior study [16] . Other conventional defense such as traffic padding, packet padding, and traffic morphing could also incur a large overhead, as reported by prior research [1] , [2] , [12] , [13] .
A practical defense against Wi-Fi traffic analysis is expected to have the following properties:
• Effectiveness: the defense should significantly reduce the accuracy of a traffic analysis.
• Efficiency: the technique is expected to be efficient, without incurring noticeable overheads and performance degradation.
• Generic: it is highly desired that the new approach offers a more generic protection to a wide range of applications against various side-channel analysis.
• Compatibility: the technique should be compatible with the existing standards and protocols, and transparent to users and the application developers.
To achieve these objectives, we developed a new technique based upon traffic partition [25] , [26] , a technique originally designed for privacy preserving data collection and publication. Prior research such as frequency hopping [27] partitions wireless traffic into multiple flows and transmits them through different frequencies. In contrast, our traffic demultiplexing approach creates several parallel virtual wireless interfaces, which can be associated with different applications, and also allows per-packet-based scheduling to assign each packet to a wireless interface. This treatment alters the inter-packet timings, packet size distributions and other traffic features, and therefore offers a more effective protection against traffic analysis. In addition, our new approach does not require aggressively padding packets or adding cover traffic, and therefore avoids substantial communication overhead. Figure 1 presents an example of traffic demultiplexing, which partitions and transmits the Wi-Fi traffic produced by a BitTorrent (BT) application through three virtual interfaces (as shown in Figure 1 (a)): ath0 sends packets smaller than 232 bytes; ath2 delivers those larger than 1540 bytes, and the rest goes through ath1. Figure 1 (c) shows the probability distribution function (PDF) of packet sizes on each interface, which demonstrates how our approach changes traffic characteristics in terms of packet size distributions over individual interfaces. As we can see from the figure, these traffic characteristics become dramatically distinctive from those of the original traffic.
III. TRAFFIC DEMULTIPLEXING
A. Overview
In this section, we elaborate the design and implementation of our demultiplexing techniques. is configured with different MAC addresses and treated as a fully functional, regular network interface. This virtualization can be turned on and off according to the user's privacy policies.
Bridge layer is a veneer placed above the virtualized MAC layer to provide transparent networking interfaces for its upper layers. It is responsible for dispatching outbound packets to multiple virtual interfaces through the demultiplexing scheduler and concatenating inbound packets from these interfaces through MAC translation. Demultiplexing scheduler, which ensures that schedules packets through different interfaces, is discussed in Section III-D.
We implemented our design into a prototype by modifying the latest MadWifi (madwifi-ng), a popular WLAN driver [28] , both on the AP and on the client side. Our implementation works well with Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), WPA/WPA2, and dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP), etc. It is compatible with the IEEE 802.11 protocol set: traffic demultiplexing on a client or an AP does not interfere with the communication of the parties that do not use it.
B. Creating Virtual MAC Interfaces
As illustrated in Figure 3 , virtual MAC interfaces are created by a two-way handshake through an encrypted channel, which includes the following four steps. (1) A client sends out a request to create virtual interfaces with a nonce N client , encrypted with a symmetric key shared by the client and the AP. (2) Upon receiving the request, the AP first chooses the number of virtual interfaces to create, denoted as I, which is determined by the privacy policies set by the user and the available resource. The privacy policy can be as simple as whether a specific application, indicated by its Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) port numbers, needs this demultiplexing service. Each virtual interface created is given an unused MAC address randomly selected by the AP. More specifically, a MAC address has 48 bits, with the first 24 bits used to identify the vendor. Our approach ensures that only the 24-bit sequences related to real vendors are picked up when assigning virtual addresses, thereby making the virtual interfaces look realistic. To keep track of these addresses, the AP maintains To cancel a virtual interface, the client goes through a similar handshaking process to request the AP to release the interface. In this way, the AP is able to actively recycle the resources and dynamically configure virtual interfaces. This two-way handshake can be piggybacked in the management frames (e.g., probe frames and association frames) specified by the IEEE 802.11. However, these frames are not encrypted by current APs and Wi-Fi clients. As a result, we had to implement the protocol into the encrypted data frames of IEEE 802.11, which also require the client to be first authenticated by the AP.
C. Communication with Virtual Interfaces
Traffic demultiplexing supports virtual MAC interfaces on a wireless card, with different MAC addresses working in a station mode. It dynamically specifies device attributes for each packet and makes each virtual interface look like a different wireless card. Also, we modified the sending and receiving procedures of the MadWifi on both the AP and client sides. The details of this implementation are described as follows.
Sending procedure. For sending frames, we set the device attributes (e.g., MAC address, priority transmission queue, transmission power, and data rate) of each virtual interface dynamically for each packet passing through. First, the demultiplexing scheduler assigns a virtual MAC interface to a packet. As shown in Figure 4 , a packet is dispatched to the virtual interface ath0. Then ath0 encapsulates the packet to a MAC frame. Note that the current network adapter ensures that the size of an IP packet is within the maximum transmission unit (MTU) specified at the MAC layer, and therefore re-fragment of the packet becomes unnecessary. Such an encapsulation was implemented in the function "ieee80211 encap". After that, the virtual interface adjusts the transmission power and data rate before sending the packet, as a real wireless card does.
Receiving procedure. According to the IEEE 802.11, a client drops the packets whose destination MAC addresses do not match the client's MAC address. In our implementation, we set the receiver filter "rfilt" of the physical wireless interface to promiscuous mode (HAL RX F ILT ER P ROM) and then utilized a software filter to only accept the packet when its destination address is one of the virtual MAC addresses the client possesses. As illustrated in Figure 4 , the client performs MAC translation by replacing the virtual MAC address in the destination address field with the unique physical MAC address before the packet is delivered to the upper-layer. This translation makes our changes to the MAC layer transparent to the protocols working on the upper layers, especially to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) that maps an IP address to a physical MAC address. We implemented MAC translation in the decapsulation function "ieee80211 decap."
An AP keeps record of the MAC addresses of the clients connecting to it (or "associated" with it). For each packet received, the AP checks its source MAC address and drops the packet if the address is not known. In our research, we modified "ieee80211 f ind rxnode", a function that searches for such associated addresses, to replace virtual MAC addresses with their corresponding physical counterparts. We also enabled the AP to perform the MAC translation as described before.
In summary, traffic demultiplexing is transparent to upperlayer and other protocol stacks. Also, our modification on the MAC layer does not affect user experience and is compatible with the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
ACK Loss vs. Rate Control.
In Wi-Fi settings, data rate is adaptive to the channel quality measured by packet loss rate, which is estimated based on the MAC-layer acknowledgement (ACK) frames. These ACK frames are sent by the wireless card automatically when the hardware receives the packets labeled its physical MAC address. However, the packets sent to virtual MAC addresses cannot trigger the ACK frames. Without MAC-layer ACK frames in standard IEEE 802.11 protocol, a sender (i.e., AP) has to retransmit the packets several times until reaching maximum retry times, which would make the sender assume that the wireless link was bad and the packet loss rate was quite high. As a result, the sender would set the data rate as low as "1Mbps". To avoid such a network performance degradation, we can use fake ACK frames generated by the network driver, or disable the ACK frames, which in turn disables the rate adaptation. For simplicity, our prototype simply disables the automatic MAC-layer ACK by changing the Atheros configuration register number 0x8048 and setting the flag HAL T XDESC N OACK. Because of disabled-ACK, traffic demultiplexing need to relay on upper layer protocols, e.g. TCP, to deal with the disorder and loss of packets. Further, we adapt the attribute, tx rate, for each individual virtual interface to dynamically control its data rate.
D. Demultiplexing Scheduler
The demultiplexing scheduler aims to hide the characteristics of the original traffic by dispatching packets through different virtual interfaces. This objective, however, cannot be well served by naive scheduling policies such as Random Algorithm (RA) (randomly scheduling a packet to a virtual interface) and Round-Robin (RR) (scheduling packets in the order of virtual interfaces), as the traffic characteristics (e.g. packet size distribution) can still be recovered by monitoring a wireless interface sufficiently long: after all, the sniffed traces represent an unbiased sample from the original traffic. Hence, more effective scheduling techniques need to be developed to transform the traffic features beyond recognition. Here we elaborate the approaches designed and implemented in our research. The traffic characteristics most extensively used in traffic analysis include packet size and packet interarrival time. Our approach schedules the packets within the same traffic flow through different interfaces, which automatically causes the interarrival times observed from individual virtual interfaces to deviate from that measured from the physical interface. In addition, buffering the packets when sending them out will cause noticeable overhead, then we schedule the packets in real time. Therefore, the focus of our research is on changing the packet size distributions associated with individual virtual interfaces to deceive the eavesdropping adversary. Let I be the number of virtual interfaces and max be the maximum packet size of incoming packets. Assume that there are L possible packet size ranges,
where L = max . Let p i j be the probability of packets whose size is among ( j−1 , j ] on the virtual interface i. We define the target probability distribution φ i on interface i, where
j is denoted as the target probability of the packet size within ( j−1 , j ] on the virtual interface i. Preferably, we hope to make p i j as close to φ i j as possible. Therefore, given φ i , how to design a demultiplexing scheduler to emulate the target is essentially an optimization problem as follows.
where N (i) is the number of packets on the interface i, N is the total number of packets, and we define P j as the probability of packet size between ( j−1 , j ] in the original traffic. Note that different φ i reflects different scheduling policy, and here we describe how to determine the target packet size distribution, φ i , to mislead adversaries and prevent them from linking virtual interfaces to a specific user.
Masquerading Demultiplexing (MD).
This scheduling strategy is designed to make the traffic scheduled on a virtual interface look as if it is produced by a real application, so as to cheat the adversary into believing that the user is doing something else.
To determine φ i for MD, let's first define the packet size ranges. Figure 5 shows the packet size distribution of various applications. We observe that the sizes of more than 95% packets fall into two ranges: [ 0, 0, 1] . Based on the observation on packet size distribution, the target distribution φ i can be easily determined to masquerade interface i to a predefined application. With such φ i , the MD is achieved by optimizing Equation 1. To achieve the best performance, the selection of target distribution φ i is usually dependent on the original traffic.
Since traffic demultiplexing is running online, a scheduler needs to send a packet to a virtual interface without knowing the future traffic. The true optimality is hard to attain. As so, we introduce a heuristic algorithm to achieve a close optimal solution. This heuristic algorithm selects the interface which has the largest difference between φ i j and p i j to schedule the incoming packets.
HEURISTIC ALGORITHM FOR TRAFFIC DEMULTIPLEXING: CHOOSE-VIRTUALINTERFACE(L, I, φ
We next show an example in Figure 6 to illustrate the idea in MD, where we masquerade a BT flow as chatting, online gaming, and downloading onto three virtual interfaces, respectively. Therefore, we set the target packet size distribution as φ . Through MD, the traffic on three virtual interfaces has distinct traffic characteristics and differs significantly from the original traffic.
In our design, APs and clients are allowed to choose their demultiplexing scheduling policies independently and change scheduling policies dynamically. Hence, users have the flexibility of using appropriate demultiplexing schedulers for their own privacy needs.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of the proposed technique in defending against the attempts to link the virtual interfaces to specific users and restore the features of the original Wi-Fi traffic.
As described in Section III, we have taken three measures to prevent an adversary from inferring virtual interfaces used by a specific user. (1) Encrypted communication: As shown in Section III-B, we encrypt configuration messages of traffic demultiplexing, which contain information about the mapping between virtual and physical interfaces. (2) Dynamic configuration of virtual interfaces: We enable a dynamic configuration of the parameters for virtual interfaces (e.g., number of interfaces used, MAC addresses, power and rate levels). This makes it more difficult to correctly guess how many users are in the Wi-Fi network and which virtual interfaces are used by which user. (3) Intelligent scheduling policies: We dynamically update the scheduling algorithms for traffic demultiplexing in order to change the features of the traffic on different virtual interfaces continuously. Therefore, we prevent the adversaries from accumulating valid statistics to link the virtual interfaces to a specific user. The update can be triggered by the change of security requirement or the number of users in the Wi-Fi network.
Next, we analyze the protection our techniques offer in defending against power analysis, timing analysis and composition attack.
A. Against Power Analysis
Adversaries may attempt to use wireless signal strengths measured in multiple locations to infer a user's location and, therefore, associate packets with a specific user. Many existing defenses against traffic analysis are vulnerable to such a power analysis [19] , [29] - [31] . To mitigate this threat, we adopt perpacket power control to obfuscate the observable features of received signal strength indicator (RSSI). Today's MadWifi drivers offer the support for per-packet-based transmission power control (TPC) with a granularity of 0.5dBm and low switching latency (less than 1 millisecond) [32] , [33] . By adjusting TPC at a fine granularity when performing a perpacket scheduling over virtual interfaces, we are able to diversify the RSSI values on individual virtual interfaces, which prevents the adversary from associating these interfaces with a specific user.
Our implementation enables TPC in MadWifi by setting "ath hal settpc(ah, 1)." We adopted a TPC policy that gives a fixed transmission power to each virtual interface. For an outgoing packet, traffic demultiplexing first acquires the virtual interface it belongs to through the scheduler, and then configures the transmission power attribute, "ni txpower," of this packet according to the parameter set in the virtual interface. Also, we need to disable several adaptive mechanisms, such as the antenna diversity, rate selection algorithms and virtual carrier sensing (RTS/CTS) mechanism [32] . In addition, power control may cause packet loss at receiver side and incur retransmissions if the power is too low. Hence, we adjust the transmission power in an appropriate range.
We tested the RSSI values of three virtual interfaces over one wireless card (Atheros 5212 chipset), as illustrated in Figure 7 (a). The figure shows that without TPC, RSSI values vary in a narrow range and follow the same pattern on all three virtual interfaces. Hence, it is likely for an adversary to associate these interfaces with a specific user. Using the TPC policy, Figure 7(b) demonstrates that the RSSI values on these interfaces exhibit different patterns. It appears that the traffic on these interfaces come from different users. 
B. Resistance to Timing Attacks
The packet interarrival time is often used in traffic analysis to infer sensitive user data. Such a timing side-channel leak can be effectively suppressed by traffic demultiplexing. Specifically, by distributing packets to different virtual interfaces, our approach shuffles the packets from the original Wi-Fi flow over these interfaces, making the inter-packet timings observed from individual interfaces significantly different from those of the original flow. Here, we use an example to show how it works. In the example, we scheduled packets from a web browsing application onto three virtual wireless interfaces. The average packet interarrival time of the web browsing is 0.028s. After traffic demultiplexing under MD (Section III-D), the interarrival times on the interface 1, 2, and 3 became 0.330s, 0.134s, and 0.092s respectively. The average observed interarrival time on the interface 1 falls into the range of online chatting, which is typically between 0.3s to 5s; the interarrival time on interface 2 is in the range of online gaming applications, mainly from 0.1s to 0.5s; the interface 3 appears as if it is downloading data with a bandwidth of 17KBps. Hence, the proposed traffic demultiplexing method is robust against the timing attacks. It implies that the packet interarrival time of Wi-Fi traffic can hardly be a reliable source of information for an eavesdropper, as it varies greatly depending on application settings, network conditions, service providers, and packet loss rates during sniffing.
C. Against Traffic Composition Analysis
An adversary may sniff the traffic on all the wireless interfaces and attempt to enumerate the combinations of the traffic flows. We studied such a brute force attack in a realworld scenario that involved three users doing online chatting, browsing and downloading respectively. In the experiment, the chatting and downloading traffic was transmitted through two virtual interfaces, and that of the browsing went through other three interfaces. The adversary who observed all 7 virtual interfaces faced totally 127 (
) possible combinations of the virtual interfaces. Among them, we found that at least 28 different combinations looked exactly like real traffic, including 6 chatting, 5 gaming, 6 downloading, and 11 browsing or BT communication. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of these traffic compositions are presented in Figure 8 . The red lines with circles given in the graph as the reference points indicate the CDF of real traffic, such as chatting, gaming, browsing and downloading. The black lines are the CDF distributions of virtual interfaces. Figure 8 shows that traffic from virtual interfaces is similar to the real traffic. Given this anonymity set, it became very difficult for the adversary to figure out how many users were in the Wi-Fi network and what online activities were really happening there.
D. Combining with Traffic Morphing to Enhance Security
Ideally, the Wi-Fi traffic produced by one application is divided into I sub-flows, each looking like that of a real (preferably different) application. Unfortunately, this cannot always be achieved in practice. To solve this problem, we combine the traffic demultiplexing with traffic morphing so that it can exactly cover I flows of real applications. Specifically, consider the MD algorithm described in Section III-D, we can make each sub-flow as close as possible to a real application through the elaborate selection of target distribution. Although it may be hard to satisfy all the cases, we can ensure that all but one of the I sub-flows will exhibit the traffic features of other real applications. Our approach further morphs the reminder sub-flow into another program's traffic. Note that the overheads incurred by this strategy are lower than those of the morphing technique proposed in prior research [13] , simply because we only need to work on a sub-flow of the traffic instead of the whole traffic itself. This was verified in our experimental study (Section V).
E. Further Discussion
No currently-available countermeasure can effectively mask all traffic features efficiently [34] . We want to admit that traffic demultiplexing can hardly defend against all the attacks or fingerprinting techniques, as more and more potential fingerprints are proposed. For example, adversaries may use a directional antenna with high accuracy [35] , coarse features [34] , [36] , joint distributions of traffic features and various active attacks [37] , [38] . It is also difficult to efficiently prevent all potential attacks that try to associate the traffic from multiple virtual interfaces with a physical interface. However, possible solutions might be: 1) Making traffic demultiplexing more intelligent to adapt to the transformation of Wi-Fi environment (such as number of users, RSSI distribution, throughput etc.) and specific applications by using different demultiplexing schedulers and tuning parameters. 2) Combining with other existing strategies, such as traffic morphing and padding. Under the worst case, even if the adversary can associate subflows with a specific user, traffic multiplexing is only degraded to the similar performance of traffic morphing.
In addition, this paper mainly focuses on a passive adversary who eavesdrops on the Wi-Fi channel. In a more powerful threat model, the adversary can even actively probe MAC interfaces through sending messages to the victim. Defense against active attacks by using traffic demultiplexing may be investigated in the future work.
V. EVALUATIONS
A. Real-world Deployment and Experiment Setup
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of traffic demultiplexing, we conducted experiments in a real WLAN environment. A laptop with the prototype of traffic demultiplexing installed acts as an AP, which was equipped with a Proxim AP-2000 11b/g Cardbus Series (Atheros 5212 chipset) wireless card. Clients were equipped with Atheros wireless cards with different chipsets (AR5212 and AR928X), both allowing us to modify the MadWifi driver. The AP and clients ran Ubuntu 10.04 with the kernel version of 2.6.32, and they all work in the 802.11g band. We disabled the rate adaption because of disabled-ACK and set its maximum value of 54Mbps. But the actual data rate was varied from 1Mbps to 54Mbps depending on network conditions and applications. The AP supports the data encryption with WEP/WPA/WPA2 by running hostapd (hostapd-0.7.3) [39] . The sniffer program Table I . In order to disguise, φ 1 is the distribution of chatting for every non-chatting application, and the φ 1 for chatting is the distribution of gaming. Similarly, φ 2 is [0.3, 0.2, 0.5] to make the traffic look like browsing except for the original browsing and BT applications, which are simulated as gaming. φ 3 is set as [0, 0, 1] to resemble a downloading application.
We measured the network performance of traffic demultiplexing, in terms of throughput and packet delay. We evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of traffic demultiplexing with MD under three traffic analysis attacks. In comparison with other defensive approaches, such as packet padding and traffic morphing [13] , we evaluated the efficiency of traffic demultiplexing when defending against various traffic analysis attacks.
B. Network Performance 1) Throughput and Delay:
In this subsection, we discussed the network performance of traffic demultiplexing. We tested traffic demultiplexing in the testbed with five applications, shown in Table II . Experiment results showed that the average throughput for the original traffic was a little bit larger than traffic demutliplexing with MD, and the average packet interarrival time of the original traffic was smaller. The small increase in delay and decrease in throughput was because we enabled the promiscuous mode of the wireless card and disabled MAC-layer ACK in order to implement the MAC layer virtualization. In the promiscuous mode, a receiver filters out the packets for other destinations by software instead of hardware. Without MAC-layer ACK, more upper-layer retransmissions will occur to compensate the MAC layer loss. However, by using the traffic demultiplexing technique, the change in throughput and delay is almost unnoticeable. We will show, in next subsection, that traffic demultiplexing does not affect the available bandwidth for other users.
2) Scalability: We evaluated the scalability of traffic demultiplexing by investigating the performance of a bandwidthconsuming application, "online video," when setting the different number of virtual interfaces (I). Figure 9 shows the CDF of bandwidth consumption when we ran the same online video for 15 minutes in "YouTube" on different I. The data rate is computed per second. It demonstrates that the bandwidth consumed under different virtual interfaces remains almost unchanged despite the increase of I. Traffic demultiplexing scales well when we increase the number of virtual interfaces. Hence, the adoption of traffic demultiplexing by a user does not affect the experience of others.
C. Effectiveness and Efficiency
We investigated the three common attack scenarios to evaluate the efficacy of traffic demultiplexing. We implemented traffic morphing according to the similar scheduling as [13] . We set the statistical distance threshold (L1 distance = 0) in our implementation of traffic morphing. For online activities and web-browsing identifications, the rows/columns of the morphing matrix representing in traffic morphing uses individual packet sizes. Tri-gram distributions are used for the VoIP identification. In addition, we used "Black Box" Morphing described in [13] in the VoIP application. Furthermore, we did not split packets as [13] because splitting packets will incur more network overhead such as encryption/decryption overhead, increase of channel collisions and decrease of network throughput.
1) Against the Identification of Online Activities:
We built a classification system by incorporating SVM and NN techniques, to infer a user's online activities among seven online applications: browsing (br.), chatting (ch.), gaming (ga.), downloading(do.), uploading(up.), online video (vo.) and BitTorrent (bt.) [7] . Traffic traces were collected as training data to build the classification model. After that, we set In terms of accuracy, we find that gaming, browsing, online video, and BT applications are undetectable in MD. In contrast, the classification accuracy is pretty high for chatting, downloading and uploading. Downloading is even higher than the original case. The reason is that most applications are disguised as a composition of chatting and downloading, hence the classification tends to identifying all the traffic as chatting or downloading. In addition, uploading is the only application which has low traffic in downlink but high traffic in uplink, compared with other applications. Hence, it is hard to disguise uploading as another application.
We compared traffic demultiplexing with traffic morphing as shown in Table III . Specifically, we morphed chatting to gaming, disguised gaming as browsing, simulated browsing as BT, made BT look like online video, padded video to be downloaded. Traffic morphing reduced the accuracy to 71.18%. It had less overhead than packet padding but still with 39.44% overhead. Our defensive method, traffic demultiplexing with MD, achieved lower accuracy of 44.21% with a even smaller overhead, 13.53%. The overhead was introduced to ensure traffic on an individual virtual interface like a real application, described in Section IV-C. These data show that traffic demultiplexing performed better than traffic morphing in our measurements. It was a significant improvement in both privacy and overhead.
2) Against the Identification of Web Pages: In this subsection, we show the efficiency of traffic demultiplexing under the web page identification attack using naive Bayes classifier (NBC) [10] , [13] .
We first set up the traffic analysis attack to system [1] , [10] , and used morphing, random padding, and traffic demul- tiplexing to defend against such an attack, respectively. We collected traffic traces of top 80 web pages of USA according to Alexa [41] in encrypted Wi-Fi networks. Based on packet size in the MAC layer, we investigated the identifiability of these web pages. Table IV shows the comparison of the performance of traffic demultiplexing with random padding and traffic morphing. For random padding, every packet was appended with a padding of random length in [0, 256) bytes to achieve a good tradeoff between efficiency and overhead. For traffic morphing, we used the same optimal scheduling as [13] .
In traffic demultiplexing, the number of virtual interfaces is 3 (I = 3). The packet size ranges for MD were [0, 500), [500, 1000), and [1000, max ] bytes.
We observed that the accuracy and overhead were both lowest with the protection of traffic demultiplexing. Note that the classification accuracy values in our experiment are all smaller than those in [13] . The reason is that the data of web pages was collected from the transport layer in [13] , while we collected the data from the MAC layer in our experiments. Hence, we cannot tell which packets belong to one web page.
3) Against the Identification of VoIP Features:
In this subsection, we show how traffic demultiplexing defends against the identification of VoIP features. We collected VoIP data for 40 minutes by using a variable bit-rate (VBR) codec such as speex [42] . The data are encrypted by the IETF standard Secure Real-time Transport Protocol [43] . We implemented a similar testbed as [4] and tested the differentiation between English and Spanish by using the naive Bayes classifier. We compared the efficiency of traffic demultiplexing with random padding and traffic morphing. For random padding, every packet was appended with a padding of random length in [0, 60) bytes. For traffic morphing, we use the optimal scheduling as similar as [13] . In traffic demultiplexing, the ranges of packet size are [0, 32), [32, 60) , and [60, max ] for MD. Note that we obtained three accuracy numbers corresponding to the three traces that MD produces. The reported the highest among the three.
From the results shown in Table V , we see that traffic demultiplexing achieves the best protection against information leak with a significantly reduced overhead.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses
Traffic analysis on side-channel information leaks has threatened users' privacy in various of applications, such as SSH [6] , keystroke dynamics [44] [45], web browsing [1] , [2] , [46] , video streaming [3] , and VoIP [4] , [5] etc. Encrypted traffic does not prevent an attacker from violating users' privacy through traffic analysis. Traffic analysis attacks on encrypted HTTP streams [1] , [2] , [46] are reported to be able to reveal what a user is browsing. The traffic characteristics on encrypted VoIP packets [5] can be used to identify phrases used in a call. In addition, due to the shared-medium nature, user identification, location, tracking, and behaviors are all at risk from state-of-the-art traffic analysis attacks [18] , [29] , [30] , [47] , [48] .
Regarding the defense mechanism, high-level mitigation policies, such as packet padding [1] , [2] and traffic morphing [13] , are likely to be either inefficient or incur significant overhead. Pseudonyms [17] , [18] may still lead to information leaks in terms of coarse granularity of traffic partition. The identifier-free approach proposed in [16] encrypts all explicit identifiers from all transmitted bits to improve privacy, but the overhead of encryption and key management cannot be overlooked. Hence, an efficient and effective defense against side-channel information leaks is an important research topic with strong practical relevance.
B. Virtualization in Wi-Fi Networks
Recently,researchers have introduced virtualization into WiFi networks. A fat virtual AP introduced in [49] is an 802.11 driver that aggregates the bandwidth available at accessible APs for users and also balances their loads. VirtualWiFi [50] or MultiNet [51] uses a network hopping scheme to switch the wireless card across multiple APs of wireless LANs with one MAC address. The PeerBoost [52] system uses the coexistence of infrastructure and ad-hoc modes over the one wireless card to maximize the throughput of Wi-Fi networks. Different from previous research, our work on traffic demultiplexing creates multiple virtual interfaces and shapes different traffic characteristics on individual interfaces to protect user privacy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose traffic demultiplexing to protect user privacy. It creates multiple virtual MAC interfaces, dynamically dispatches traffic flows over these interfaces, and rebuilds different traffic characteristics for each virtual interface to obscure the original patterns. Since traffic demultiplexing does not require aggressively padding packets or adding cover traffic, and therefore avoids substantial communication overhead. In addition, traffic demultiplexing is transparent to upper layers and does not change the user experience. We evaluate the performance of traffic demultiplexing through real experiments in WLAN testbeds. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of traffic demultiplexing in defending against various traffic analysis attacks. Further, traffic demultiplexing has good scalability and hence is suitable for WLANs deployed in residential, hotspot, and campus environments.
To improve the performance of traffic demultiplexing and make it more practical, the following strategies could be adopted: 1) We disabled the ACK frames in this paper. But disabled ACK may incur the unreliable transmission (e.g., disorder of packet delivery, packet loss) and then a significant loss of throughput in a large WLAN. For improvement, we may know how to revise the driver to implement sending the ACK under the control.
2) The parameters of virtual interfaces and demultiplexing scheduling policies of APs and clients are able to change adaptively and dynamically according to the transformation of Wi-Fi networks (such as number of users, RSSI distribution, throughput etc.) and specific applications.
3) We will perform traffic demultiplexing and validate its performance for a wide range of practical network scenarios in future work.
In addition, the discussion of this paper mainly focuses on a passive adversary who eavesdrops on the Wi-Fi channel. In our follow-up research, we will further study active attacks and possible countermeasures with traffic demultiplexing. Furthermore, the defensive approach we proposed is more general. It can be adopted in many other wireless device drivers (e.g., ath5k and iwlagn) and applied to other network layers for the general purpose of privacy enhancement.
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